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JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE 1983 
AMENDMENTSTOTHEFEDERALCIVIL 
RULES 
Carl Tobias* 
What if a federal district judge relied on Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 16 to require that the civil rights plaintiff whom you 
represent participate in a summary jury trial which would jeop-
ardize the plaintiff's case by revealing most of it to the defend-
ant? Suppose that a trial court invoked the same Rule to instruct 
an insurer that it must send to a settlement conference an officer 
having authority to settle within a range which the judge 
specified. 
Imagine that, to win a lawsuit alleging deprivations of constitu-
tional rights and to comply with Rule 11, you thoroughly 
researched the law, developing creative legal theories which sup-
ported several counts of a complaint. Suppose that a district 
court or a magistrate then strongly suggested during a pretrial 
conference that you drop those counts, because the judicial offi-
cial believed that the counts were frivolous. 
What if a judge applied Rule 26 to substantially limit a plain-
tiff's discovery as unduly burdensome or expensive, considering 
the litigant's resources or the relative insignificance of the case's 
needs, the amount in controversy or the issues at stake? Suppose 
that the court restricted discovery, even though the plaintiff had 
limited access to, and money ·for assembling data in the files of 
the defendant police department. This information was important 
in proving the case, and the plaintiff sought to permanently en-
join employment practices that purportedly discriminated against 
many workers. Moreover, what if the district judge or magistrate 
actually imposed, or threatened to levy, sanctions as onerous as 
attorneys' fees for failure to comply with his or her demands or 
suggestions? 
Judicial officers have taken all of these actions, and numerous 
• Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Hesse and Peggy 
Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer, Charlotte Wilmerton and Beverly Steven-
son for processing this Article, and the Harris Trust and· 'the University of Montana for 
generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are mine. 
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similar actions, pursuant to the 1983 amendments to Rules 11, 16 
and 26. The actions are memorialized in many written determina-
tions. A number of these cases have not been appealed and few of 
those appealed have been reversed, principally because circuit 
courts have deferentially reviewed this district court 
decisionmaking. 
If the trial judges and magistrates have committed such expan-
sive exercises of discretion to writing, consider what actions they 
might be taking inforinally. Indeed, substantial anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that the officials have wielded even broader dis-
cretion informally; they are less likely to be challenged or to be 
held accountable in that context. Most importantly, the type of 
enforcement described above has disadvantaged many parties, 
particularly civil rights plaintiffs, whose active participation in 
federal civil litigation Congress specifically intended to facilitate. 
It is extremely difficult to document the prevalence of this ac-
tivity among federal judges and magistrates. Nonetheless, the 
conduct appears· sufficiently widespread to warrant scrutiny, 
sounding a cautionary note, and recommending certain changes in 
the Rules and in their application. When the Advisory Committee 
on the Civil Rules announced in August, 1990, that it would con-
sider revising the 1983 amendments during 1991, consideration of 
judicial enforcement of those provisions and their possible revi-
sion became imperative. · 
The first section of this Article briefly describes the develop-
ments which created the perception that the federal courts were 
experiencing a litigation explosion and which ultimately led to 
the promulgation of the 1983 amendments as one response to the 
perceived explosion. It also examines the substantive content of 
those changes, especially how the revisions enlarged federal judi-
cial discretion. The second section evaluates the courts' imple-
mentation of the 1983 amendments and finds that this applica-
tion has adversely affected numerous litigants, particularly civil 
rights plaintiffs, while providing some benefits, namely fostering 
more expeditious dispute resolution. 
The third section provides suggestions for the future. Consider-
able data show that the enforcement of Rule 11 has disadvan-
taged and chilled the enthusiasm of civil rights plaintiffs and has 
similarly affected many other litigants. Application of Rule 11 has 
concomitantly harmed the civil justice system by, for instance, 
generating extensive, and expensive, satellite litigation. Because 
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these problems outweigh the benefits of the Rule's enforcement, 
Congress and the Supreme Court should repeal or amend the pro-
vision promptly. 
Analogous difficulties apparently have attended implementa-
tion of Rules 16 and 26, although the comparative dearth of infor-
mation on their application complicates accurate assessment. Ju-
dicial invocation of the two Rules' sanctioning provisions seems 
sufficiently troubling to warrant immediate revision. Enforcement 
of the remaining subdivisions of Rules 16 and 26, which were 
modified in 1983, apparently has offered certain advantages, such 
as promoting more efficient disposition of lawsuits. Evaluators 
should analyze their implementation to ascertain whether those 
benefits are greater than the disadvantages for civil rights plain-
tiffs, additional parties and the civil litigation process. If they are 
not, Congress and the Court should amend these provisions as 
well. · 
I. THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION AND THE' 1983 AMENDMENTS 
The federal judiciary, led by Chief Justice Warren Burger, and 
certain commentators began insisting in the mid-1970's that the 
federal courts were experiencing a litigation explosion. 1 The 
judges and writers argued that there was an increasing quantity 
of federal civil litigation, too much of which was frivolous or pur-
sued for purposes other than securing decisions on the merits.2 
One important source of difficulty was said to be the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, because their provisions for flexible 
pleading, broad discovery, and substantial party and lawyer con-
trol of lawsuits enabled attorneys and their clients to abuse the 
litigation process by; for example, exploiting existing procedural 
mechanisms for strategic advantage. 3 Some observers contended 
that ce!tain types of lawsuits, especially pro se civil rights cases, 
1. I rely most in this section on Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 287-96 (1989). For examples of Chief Justice 
Burger's views, see Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A Need for Systematic Anticipation, 
in THE Pou.ND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 23 (A. Levin & R. 
Wheeler eds. 1979); Burger Says Vacancies Add to "Judicial Deficit," N.Y. Times, Dec. 
30, 1985, at 14, col. Al (urging the frequent imposition of sanctions); cf. Tobias, supra, at 
287-88 (examples of commentators). 
2. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442,U.S. 330, 345 (1979). . 
3. See Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 86 CoLUM. L. REV. 433, 440-43 (1986); Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or 
Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1984). 
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contributed substantially to mounting caseloads and that a dis-
proportionate number of the lawsuits were frivolous.• 
Most of these propositions were, and continue to be, controver-
sial. For instance, it is very difficult to define what constitutes a 
"litigation explosion" or "litigation abuse," much less to prove 
that there was an explosion or to pinpoint the quantity of abuse.11 
Notwithstanding these problems, including a nearly complete 
dearth of data, the Supreme Court, at the instigation of the Advi-
sory Committee on Civil Rules, recommended the adoption of 
sweeping amendments to Federal Rules 11, 16 and 26.6 Congress 
acquiesced in the Supreme Court's proposals, in part because it 
was unclear at the time that the revisions' judicial application 
would disadvantage litigants whose participation Congress meant 
to foster, and the changes became effective in August, 1983.7 
The drafters intended that the revisions transform the process 
of federal civil litigation.8 The amendments imposed significant, 
new responsibilities on parties and lawyers, while the modifica-
tions gave district judges substantially more control over litiga-
tion and greatly enhanced the discretion that they could exercise. 
Rule 16 had not been revised since 1938, when the Federal 
Rules were initially adopted. 9 Because the original Rule 16 tersely 
provided for many changes that had occurred in federal civil liti-
4. See, e.g., Jones v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 
1984); Rotolo v. Borough of Charleroi, 532 F.2d 920, 922 (3d Cir. 1976); Valley v. Maule, 
297 F. Supp. 958, 960 (D. Conn. 1968). But see Rotolo, 532 F.2d at 927 (Gibbons, J., con-
curring and dissenting) (civil rights cases not disproportionately frivolous); Eisenberg & 
Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641, 642-43 
(1987) (image of civil rights litigation explosion overstated and borders on myth). 
5. For much of the relevant literature and attempts to resolve certain aspects of the 
controversy, see Tobias, supra note 1, at 288-89 and sources cited therein; Tobias, Rule 1 I 
and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFFALO L. REV. 485, 522-23 (1988-89). Cf. Miller, supra 
note 3, at 5 (25-fold increase in civil rights cases between 1960 and 1972 attributable to 
Congress' passage of civil rights and voting rights statutes). 
6. See Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of 
Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1927-28 (1989); Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in Action: Assessing Their Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2198-2202 (1989). 
7. See Order Amending Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983). See 
. generally A. MILLER, THE 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: 
PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY (1984). Because 
Rule 7's revision simply subjects motions to Rule 11 's requirements, it is treated here in 
conjunction with Rule 11. 
8. See, e.g., In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1011-13 (1st 
Cir. 1988); A. MILLER, supra note 7; Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 
A.B.A. J. 1648, 1650-52 (1981). 
9. See Advisory Comm. Note, 97 F.R.D. 165, 205 (1983); see also FED. R. C1v. P. 16. 
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gation, the revisors comprehensively rewrote and expanded the 
Rule to respond to the challenges which modern litigation 
presents.10 The alterations in Rule 16 emphasized the importance 
of pretrial conferences and the increased ability of courts to man-
age the pretrial phase.11 One means of achieving these ob]ectives 
was to require that judges issue scheduling orders, an innovation 
which the Advisory Committee characterized as the "most signifi-
cant change in Rule 16."12 Another mechanism for stressing the 
importance of pretrial conferences and for enhancing judicial 
management during the pretrial stage was prescribing the imposi-
tion of sanctions for violations of the Rule's terms, a provision not 
included in the original Rule 16.13 
10. See Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 9, at 206-07. The magnitude of the revisions 
in Rules 11, 16 and 26 precludes their reproduction in full here. Nevertheless, those provi-
sions of the revisions that are most important to this paper are reproduced. For a conven-
ient source which includes the Advisory Committee Notes and facilitates comparison of 
the Rules prior to 1983 and the 1983 amendments, see id. at 165-220. 
11. See FED. R. C1v. P. 16; Tobias, supra note 1, at 292. See generally A. MILLER, supra 
note 7. 
12. Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 9, at 207. Rule 16(b) provides in pertinent part: 
(b) SCHEDULING AND PLANNING. [T]he judge ... shall, after consulting 
with the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties . . . enter a 
scheduling order that limits the time 
(1) to join other parties and to amend the pleadings; 
(2) to file and hear motions; and 
(3) to complete discovery. 
The scheduling order also may include 
(4) the date or dates for conferences before trial, a final pretrial conference, 
and trial; and 
(5) any other matters appropriate in the circumstances of the case. 
The order shall issue as soon as practicable but in no event more than 120 days 
after filing of the complaint. A schedule shall not be modified except by leave of 
the judge . . . upon a showing of good cause. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 16(b). 
13. See Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 9, at 213. Rule 16(f) provides: 
(f) SANCTIONS. If a party or party's attorney fails to obey a scheduling or 
pretrial order, or if no appearance is made on behalf of a party at a scheduling 
or pretrial conference, or if a party or party's attorney is substantially unpre-
pared to participate in the conference, or if a party or party's attorney fails to 
participate in good faith, the judge, upon motion or the judge's own initiative, 
may make such orders with regard thereto as are just, and among others any of 
the orders provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(B), (C), (D). In lieu of or in addition to any 
other sanction, the judge shall require the party or the attorney representing the 
party or both to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncom-
pliance with this rule, including attorney's fees, unless the judge finds that the 
noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an 
award of expenses unjust. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 16(f). 
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The revisors treated problems of excessive discovery and resis-
tance to, or evasion of, reasonable discovery requests by modify-
ing Rule 26 so as to accord judges more control over the discovery 
process. 14 Courts must restrict discovery if they find that the dis-
covery sought is unreasonably duplicative or cumulative or could 
be secured more easily from other sources. 111 Judges also are to 
limit discovery when they determine that the party seeking it 
"has had ample opportunity" to acquire the information, or if the 
discovery is unduly expensive or burdensome considering the 
case's needs, the amount in dispute, restrictions on the litigants' 
resources, and the significance of the iss.ues at stake in the 
lawsuit.16 
Rule 26(g) requires that judges s~nction parties or attorneys 
whose discovery requests, responses or objections are not pre-
ceded by reasonable prefiling inquiries into their factual or legal 
bases or are filed for improper purposes.17 The Rule also demands 
14. See Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 9, at 216-17; see also FED. R. C1v. P. 26(a), 
(b), (g). See generally Tobias, supra note 1, at 292. 
15. Rule 26(b) provides in pertinent part: 
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdivision 
(a) [including depositions, interrogatories, document production, physical and 
mental examinations and requests for admissions] shall be limited by the court 
if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or du-
plicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, less 
burdensome, or less expensive . . . . 
FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b). 
16. Rule 26(b) provides in pertinent part: 
Id. 
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdivision 
(a) [including depositions, interrogatories, document production, physical and 
mental examinations and requests for admissions] shall be limited by the court 
if it determines that: ... (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample oppor-
tunity by discovery in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the 
discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of 
the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and 
the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. 
17. Rule 26(g) provides in pertinent part: . 
(g) SIGNING OF DISCOVERY REQUESTS, RESPONSES, AND OBJEC-
TIONS. Every request for discovery or response or objection thereto made by a 
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of rec-
ord .... A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign the request, 
response, or objection and state the party's address. The signature of the attor-
ney or party constitutes a certification that the signer has read the request, re-
sponse, or objection, and that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, 
and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: (1) consistent with these rules 
and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modi-
fication, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for any improper purpose; 
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that courts sanction litigants or lawyers who submit discovery re-
quests, responses or objections which are unreasonable or unduly 
expensive or burdensome in light of the needs of the lawsuit, 
prior discovery, the amount in controversy and the importance of 
the questions at issue in the case.18 Amended Rule 11 similarly 
mandates that judges sanction parties or attorneys who fail to 
conduct reasonable inquiries before filing pleadings, motions or 
other papers or submit them for improper purposes.19 
II. JUDICIAL APPLICATION 
A substantial number of lower federal courts have broadly exer-
cised the increased discretion that the 1983 amendments afford 
such as to harass or to cause unnecessary. delay or needless increase in the .cost 
of litigation . . . . 
If a certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or 
upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, 
_the party on whose behalf the request, response, or objection is made, or both, 
an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the 
reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable at-
torney's fee. 
Id. 26(g). 
This language is very similar to that of Rule 11. See infra note 19. 
18. Rule 26(g) provides in pertinent part: 
[The signature] constitutes a certification that the signer has read the request, 
response, or objection, and that to the best of the signer's knowledge, informa-
tion, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry it is: . . . (3) not unreasonable 
or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the discovery 
already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the 
issues at stake in the litigation. 
FED. R. C1v. P. 26(g). 
This language is very similar to that of subsection (b) of the Rule. See supra note 16. 
19. Rule 11 provides in pertinent part: 
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer 
that the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of 
the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry 
it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argu-
ment for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is 
not interposed for any improper purpose . . . . If a pleading, motion, or other 
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own 
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or 
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other 
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the 
filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's 
fee. . 
FED. R. Ctv. P. 11. Although the overall effect of the 1983 amendments is to expand judi-
cial discretion, certain provisions, such as the mandatory sanctioning requirements of 
Rules 11 and 26, actually limit that discretion. 
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them. Some judges have applied the revisions in ways which con-
stituted abuses of this discretion and clearly disadvantaged nu-
merous litigants, especially parties who were actively involved in 
public law litigation, such as civil rights plaintiffs. · 
A. Formal Activity Involving the 1983 Amendments 
1. Rule 11 
Numerous federal courts have vigorously enforced . amended 
Rule 11 against civil rights plaintiffs. 20 District judges have found 
these plaintiffs in violation of the Rule's reasonable prefiling in-
quiry requirements more frequently than any other type of liti-
gant. 21 The Seventh Circuit and a number of district courts 
within its geographic purview have displayed considerable willing-
ness to apply Rule 11 aggressively against civil rights plaintiffs. 
For example, one Seventh Circuit panel required five turgid 
paragraphs to demonstrate that the legal theories which a civil 
rights plaintiff asserted were "wacky,"22 thus enabling the court 
to affirm the trial judge's dete.rmination that the plaintiffs plead-
ings were not grounded in law. 23 Another Seventh Circuit panel · 
upheld a district court's finding that a civil rights plaintiff had 
conducted a deficient prefiling factual investigation even when 
the plaintiff could only have secured the information needed for 
Rule 11 compliance through discovery.24 Numerous, additional 
courts have decided that plaintiffs contravened the Rule in civil 
rights cases which were "close" legally or factually. 211 
Some judges have implemented the mandatory duty to levy ap-
propriate sanctions for Rule 11 violations by exercising their dis-
cretion to impose substantial monetary assessments on civil rights 
20. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 303-04; Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D. 
189, 205, 217 (1988). 
21. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 490; Vairo, supra note 20, at 200-01. 
22. Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085 (7th Cir. 1987) 
(Cudahy J., concurring in part, dissenting in part), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 901 (1988). 
23. Id. at 1083-85. 
24. See Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194, 205-06 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'g 596 
F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Ill. 1984). 
25. See Vairo, supra note 20, at 217; see, e.g., Jennings v. Joshua Indep. School Dist., 
869 F.2d 870, 878-79, opinion amended and superseded, 877 F.2d 313, 320-21 (5th Cir. 
1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3212 (1990); Goldberg v. Weil, 707 F. Supp. 357, 362 (N.D. 
Ill. 1989). A number of cases also do not appear to be close. See Vairo, supra note 20, at 
217; see, e.g., Bogney v. Jones, 904 F.2d 272, 274 (5th Cir. 1990). 
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plaintiffs.36 Courts have levied large financial sanctions, notwith-
standing the availability of a broad array of other possible sanc-
tions ranging from reprimands to attorneys' fees. 27 For instance, a 
public interest organization is currently appealing a $1,000,000 
sanction. H Different district courts in the Eastern District of 
North Carolina recently awarded more than $80,000 against law-
yers for civil rights plaintiffs in separate controversial cases.29 In-
.deed, monetary assessments, often of attorneys' fees, remain the 
"sanction of choice. "30 
Moreover, the Supreme Court recently held that "an appellate 
court should apply an abuse-of-discretion standard in reviewing 
all aspects of a district court's Rule 11 determinations."31 Adop-
tion of this very deferential standard enhances the already sub-
stantial discretion of trial judges as first tier decision-makers. 32 
Circuit courts applying this standard will not closely analyze any 
dimension of district court Rule 11 jurisprudence; the resulting 
deference to first-tier decision-makers is evident in recent appel-
late decisions regarding the Rule. For example, during Septem-
ber, 1990, two Fourth Circuit panels failed to scrutinize, and up-
held, trial court determinations that plaintiffs' attorneys had 
violated Rule 11 in controversial civil rights cases. 33 
26. For the relevant la~guage of Rule 11, see supra note 19. 
27. See infra text accompanying notes 119-21. 
28. See Avirgan v .. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544, order clarified by 125 F.R.D. 189 (S.D. Fla.), 
appeal filed, No. 89-5515 (11th Cir. 1989). 
29. See Harris v. Marsh, 679 F. Supp. 1204, 1384-93 (E.D.N.C. 1987) ($84,000 sanction 
levied in employment discrimination litigation), vacated in part on reconsideration, 123 
F.R.D. 204 (E.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part sub nom. Blue v. 
United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 
3701 (1991); Robeson Defense Comm. v. Britt, 132 F.R.D. 650 (E.D.N.C. 1989) ($122,834 
sanction imposed in civil rights litigation involving Native Americans and African Ameri-
cans in Robeson County), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part sub nom. In re 
Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 59 U.S.L.W. 3702 (1991). The attor-
neys probably will be unable to convince the district judges to reduce the sanctions 
substantially. 
30. See Tobias, Reassessing Rule 1J and Civil Rights Cases, 33 How. L.J. 161, 170 
(1990); Tobias, supra note 5, at 501. The Federal Judicial Center, in its preliminary analy-
sis of data on Rule 11 activity since 1987 in five district courts which have fully computer-
ized docket information, found that the percentage of rulings that awarded fees to oppos-
ing parties ranged from a low of 70% to a high of 93%. PRELIMINARY REPORT ON RULE 11, 
at 11 (Feb. 27, 1991) ("Summary of Rule 11 Field Study Reports"). 
31. See Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2461 (1990). 
32. See Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837 (1984) (comprehensive analysis of increas-
ing appellate court deference to first tier decisionmakers). 
33. See In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d at 525; Blue, 914 F.2d at 547-48; see also White v. 
General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 683 (10th Cir. 1990). 
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Judicial decisions finding that civil rights plaintiffs and lawyers 
had contravened the Rule and the resultant imposition of sanc-
tions have had deleterious implications for many of these parties 
and practitioners, whose lack of resources leave them especially 
vulnerable to chilling. These litigants, other parties, and the civil 
justice system have· also been detrimentally affected by the incon-
sistent judicial application of Rule 11 and by the expensive satel-
lite litigation that the provision has engendered. For instance, two. 
respected members of the Maine bar recently spent thousands of 
dollars appealing a $250 sanction to protect their reputations and 
as a "matter of principle" in an environmental case. 34 The First 
Circuit affirmed the lower court ruling, although the appellate 
panel admitted that the case was close. n 
2. Rule 16 
The federal judiciary's enforcement of revised Rule 16 appears 
to have created equally problematic difficulties. Numerous dis-
trict courts have required that litigants participate in summary 
jury trials.38 These are half-day proceedings in which counsel for 
each side have one hour to present "opening and closing argu-
ments [that] are amalgamated with a narrative overview of the 
trial proofs."37 The six-person jury hears the presentations, re-
ceives a brief charge from the judge and renders a nonbinding 
verdict which is used to facilitate settlement. 38 Trial judges have 
demanded the involvement of parties in summary jury trials, de-
spite both increasing criticism of district court authority to com-
pel participation and growing doubt about the efficacy of such 
trials. 
For example, a trial judge recently stated that the summary 
34. See Maine Audubon Soc'y v. Purslow, 907 F.2d 265, 266 (1st Cir. 1990). See gener-
ally Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, at 8, 18 (1991) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author). 
35. See Purslow, 907 F.2d at 266, 269. 
36. See, e.g., Home Owners Funding Corp. of Am. v. Century Bank, 695 F. Supp. 1343, 
1347 n.3 (D. Mass. 1988); Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 606 
(D. Minn. 1988); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 44-46 (E.D. Ky. 1988); Ara-
bian Am. Oil Co. v. Scarfone, 119 F.R.D. 448, 449 (M.D. Fla. 1988). Cf. Cincinnati Gas & 
Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 854 F.2d 900 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Cincin-
nati Post v. General Elec. Co., 489 U.S. 1033 (1989) (first amendment right of public ac-
cess does not apply to summary jury trials). 
37. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute 
Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 471 (1984). · 
38. See id. at 470-71. 
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jury trial procedure is not authorized by Congress and that fed-
eral courts lack power to summon jurors who function as settle-
ment advisors. 39 The judge also questioned the effectiveness of 
the mechanism because its non-binding character '~presents great 
temptation to strategically withhold crucial evidence and argu-
ment [and because] when forced, a party might view. it as an un-
acceptable burden or bludgeon.'"'0 Judge Posner similarly ob-
served that he could "find nothing . in Rule 16 (pretrial 
conferences) to suggest that judges are authorized to convene ju-
ries to assist in settlement" and expressed doubt that Congress 
had empowered courts to empanel summary jurors.•1 Judge Pos-
ner also suggested that summary jury trials might compromise 
the integrity of the jury system and that the results of his admit-
tedly "crude study" failed to "support a conclusion that the sum-
mary jury trial increases judicial efficiency.''n Professor Wiegand 
recently found that the procedure was ineffective, principally be-
cause its "verdicts do not always reliably indicate what a regular 
jury would determine"'3 and the technique generally fails to pro-
duce settlement efficaciously." 
Moreover, mandated summary jury trials disproportionately 
disadvantage plaintiffs. If a plaintiff participates, that party will 
be harmed more than the defendant by the revelation of its case 
during the summary trial."' Thus, plaintiffs have stronger reason 
not tO participate; however, if they refuse to participate courts 
may be unreceptive to their substantive claims or may sanction 
them. 
Indeed, one district court held a lawyer in criminal contempt 
for refusing to submit his client's civil rights case to a summary 
39. Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 508, 510 (N.D. Ohio 1990). 
40. Id. at 508 n.3. See also Comment, Mandatory Summary Jury Trials: Playing by the 
Rules?, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1495 (1989) (criticism of authority and doubt about efficacy). 
41. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 385-86 (1986) (doubt about 
efficacy). 
42. Id. at 382. 
43. Wiegland, A New Light ·Bulb or the Work of the Devil? A Current Assessment of 
Summary Jury Trials, 69 OR. L. REV. 87; 100 (1990). 
44. Id. at 103. But see Note, Rule 16 and Pretrial Conferences: Have We Forgotten the 
Most Important Ingredient?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1449 (1990) (defense of technique). 
45. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 115 F.R.D. 333, 334-35 (C.D. Ill.), vacated, 830 
F.2d 195 (7th Cir. 1987), as amended, 838 F.2d 884 (1988). See generally Maatman, The 
Future of Summary Jury Trials in Federal Courts: Strandell v. Jackson County, 21 J. 
MARSHALL L. REV. 455 (1988). 
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jury trial. A panel of the Seventh Circuit properly determined 
that Rule 16 does not authorize compulsory summary jury trials · 
and that their use as a pretrial settlement technique would seri-
ously threaten the well-established requirements governing dis-
covery and the work-product privilege.'8 The Seventh Circuit is 
the only appellate court which has so found, and "no one knows 
exactly how many judges mandate such a procedure, nor how, nor 
when."" 
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit, en bane, recently held that a 
trial court could order a corporate officer with settlement author-
ity to attend a settlement conference and might sanction the cor-
poration, which was represented by counsel, for not complying 
even though the company clearly stated that it would not settle 
and Rule 16 only prescribes the attendance of counsel and unrep-
resented parties. 48 One trial court even informed an insurer's at-
torney that the corporation was "not to send some flunky who 
has no authority to negotiate [to a settlement conference but 
rather] someone who can enter into a settlement in [a certain] 
range without having to call anyone else"; when the company re-
fused, the judge struck its pleadings while permitting the insurer 
to "purge itself of contempt" with a public apology.49 Numerous 
additional trial courts have similarly invoked Rule 16 to pressure 
litigants or lawyers to settle their cases, while several circuits 
have felt compelled to admonish some of the district judges that 
the Rule "was not designed as a means for clubbing the parties 
46. See Strandell v. Jackson County, 838 F.2d 884, 886-88 (7th Cir. 1988); see also 
Hume v. M & C Management, 129 F.R.D. 506, 510 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (only Congress by 
enactment may compel individuals to serve as summary jurors); United States v. Exum, 
744 F. Supp. 803, 805 (N.D. Ohio 1990) (same). 
47. Wiegand, supra note 43, at 114. Cf. Caldwell v. Ohio Power Co., 710 F. Supp. 194, 
202 (N.D. Ohio 1989) (summary jury trial conducted as part of case's routine pretrial 
processing); Lambros, The Federal Rules of Ciuil Procedure: A New Adversarial Model 
for a New Era, 50 U. PI'IT. L. REV. 789, 802 (1989) (estimating that 100 federal and state 
judges have used summary jury trials in more than 1000 cases); Maatman, supra note 45, 
at 457 (estimating that more than 65 federal judges had employed the process as of 1988); 
Comment, Compelled Participation in Innouatiue Pretrial Proceedings, 84 Nw. U.L. REV. 
290, 309 (1989) (federal courts across nation order summary jury trials). 
48. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 656-57 (7th Cir. 1989). 
See also Dvorak v. Shibata, 123 F.R.D. 608 (D. Neb. 1988); In re Air Crash Disaster at 
Stapleton Int'! Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1433 (D. Colo. 1988); Abney v. Patten, 696 F. Supp. 
567 (W.D. Okla. 1987). See generally Comment, supra note 40, at 1510-13. For a recent 
example of apparently appropriate sanctioning under Rule 16 in a civil rights case, see 
John v. Louisiana, 899 F.2d 1441, 1448-49 (5th Cir. 1990). 
49. Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44, 45-46 (E.D. Ky. 1987). 
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... into an involuntary compromise,"110 as the Advisory Commit-
tee Note accompanying amended Rule 16 explicitly provides.61 
An increasing number of trial courts have exercised their dis-
cretion under Rule 16 in civil rights and employment discrimina-
tion ·litigation to levy the ultimate sanction of dismissing the 
plaintiffs' cases.62 Although nearly all of the lawsuits involved in-
fractions by attorneys of requirements governing pretrial confer-
ences, relatively few appellate courts have found that the dismis-
sals of the parties' claims constituted abuses of discretion. 
Illustrative is an employment discrimination action in which 
the district judge relied principally on Rule 16(f) to dismiss plain-
tiffs case with prejudice. 6 3 The court dismissed the litigant's 
claim, finding that her counsel failed to comply with a pretrial 
order which required that both parties file comprehensive infor-
mation with the court before trial. 11" The Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that the dismissal was not an abuse of discretion, because 
refusal to comply with the order delayed the lawsuit's expeditious 
resolution, impaired the trial court's management of its docket, 
and prejudiced defendant and that the district judge had consid-
ered less drastic sanctions. 66 Moreover, the panel rejected the ar-
gument of plaintiffs counsel that she was not obligated to comply 
with the pretrial order because it was invalid, describing the order 
50. Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985). Accord Newton v. A.C.& S., Inc., 
918 F.2d 1121, 1128-29 (3d Cir. 1990); In re Ashcroft, 888 F.2d 546, 547 (8th Cir. 1989); 
Strandell, 838 F.2d at 887; see also Hess v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 846 F.2d 
114, 116 (2d Cir. 1988); Abney v. Patten, 696 F. Supp. 567, 568 (W.D. Okla. 1987); cf. 
National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 844 F.2d 216, 
222-23 (5th Cir. 1988) (failure to compromise case even pursuant to terms suggested by 
court is not grounds for sanctions). See generally P. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL 
(1986). 
51. "It is not the purpose of Rule 16(b)(7) to impose settlement negotiations on unwill-
ing litigants." Advisory Comm. Note, supra note 9, at 210. 
52. See, e.g., Dukes v. Ward, 129 F.R.D. 478, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). District court dismis-
sal orders were upheld in both Thompson v. Housing Auth., 782 F.2d 829 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 479 U.S. 829 (1986), and Callip v. Harris County Child Welfare Dep't, 757 F.2d 
1513, 1522 (5th Cir. 1985). 
53. See Malone v. United States Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
488 U.S. 819 (1988). 
54. Id. at 129-30. 
55. Id. at 131-33. The Ninth Circuit, thus, considered four of the five factors that courts 
are to examine in deciding whether. to dismiss a claim for non-compliance with a court 
order. Id. at 130. The Ninth Circuit failed to discuss the fifth factor, the public policy 
which favors merits-based disposition of litigation, because the factor did not outweigh the 
others, even though it weighed against dismissal. Id. at 133 n.2. 
946 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:933 
as a legitimate mechanism for· improving court efficiency.116 The 
circuit court also concluded that the district judge had not abused 
his discretion by refusing to excuse plaintiff for her lawyer's omis-
sion, in light of the egregious character of the attorney's malfea-
sance.117 One member of the panel dissented, however, stating that 
the sanction of dismissal was harsh and improperly imposed in 
this instance.118 The dissent believed that dismissal was inappro-
priate, because merit-based dispositions should be promoted, par-
ticularly when, in the dissent's opinion, the trial court had neither 
considered the feasibility of levying less extreme sanctions nor 
warned plaintiffs of the impending dismissal.119 
3. Rule 26 
Judges have taken formal action less frequently under amended 
Rule 26 than revised Rule 11 or amended Rule 16. Indeed, the 
Advisory Committee, in its August 1990 announcement, observed 
that sanction provisions adopted in 1983 have been employed 
principally in "connection with alleged pleading abuses," even 
though the 1983 drafters and the American Bar Association "were 
at least as concerned with discovery abuses."60 The Committee 
56. Id. at 133-34. 
57. Id. at 134. 
58. Id. at 134 (Tang, J., dissenting). 
59. Id. at 134-35 (Tang, J., dissenting). The dissent disagreed with the majority's asser-
tion that certain actions of the trial judge "were attempts at less drastic alternatives," id. 
at 134, and emphasized the fifth factor, which the majority did not discuss. See supra note 
55. Additional examples of cases not finding abuses of discretion are Ikerd v. Lacy, 852 
F.2d 1256, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 1988); Brinkmann v. Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 749-57 (5th Cir. 
1987). But see John v. State of Louisiana, 828 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1987) (reversing dismis· 
sal with prejudice under Rule 16 because no clear record of delay or contumaci~us conduct 
and lesser sanctions would have been fairer); Salahuddin v. Harris, 782 F.2d 1127, 1133 
(2d Cir. 1986) (failure to obey "implied" pretrial order does not justify sanctipns under 
Rule 16(f)); Williams v. Georgia Dep't of Human Resources, 789 F.2d 881, 883 (11th Cir. 
1986) (reversing district judge's reliance on Rule 16 to dismiss case considered meritless). 
My primary concerns are that the lawyers' mistakes not be visited on the clients and that 
prose litigants not be disadvantaged unduly. Cf. Woodmore v. Git-N-Go, 790 F.2d 1497, 
1498-99 (10th Cir. 1986) (punishment must be imposed on person at fault): Some courts 
are sensitive to these concerns; they may impose monetary sanctions only on the attorney 
or dismiss without prejudice or affirm such disposition on appeal. See, e.g., Ikerd, 852 F.2d 
at 1258; Dukes v. Ward, 129 F.R.D. 478, 482 n.l (S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
60. See Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
United States, Call For Written Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Ciuil Pro-
cedure and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 344, 345 (1990) [hereinafter Call for Comments]. 
Although the Advisory Committee's announcement spoke of the 1983 amendments, it did 
not mention Rule 16 specifically .. 
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speculated that the problem of discovery abuse may have been 
overstated or been rectified by Rule 26(g)'s prophylactic effect or 
that the bar has yet to realize the Rule's potential.61 Another ap-
parent explanation for the comparative dearth of formal Rule 26 
activity is that lawyers are accustomed to resolving many discov-
ery disputes with additional discovery rules, such as Rule 37. A 
number of discovery controversies under Rule 26 also may have 
been so insignificant that they did not warrant resolution in writ-
ing, much less in reported opinions. 
It is difficult to glean an accurate "feel" for the facts of those 
Rule 26 discovery disputes which courts have resolved in writing. 
Furthermore, many federal judges apparently remain committed 
to the idea-reflected in the 1938 Federal Rules and in numerous 
substantive statutes-that discovery should be rather freely per-
mitted, especially in civil rights and employment discrimination 
litigation. 62 These factors complicate the assessment of formal 
Rule 26 decisionmaking. Courts have, however, taken some rele-
vant action pursuant to Rule 26 or in conjunction with Rules 11 
or 16. 
The First Circuit has upheld the exercise of broad district court 
discretion to enter "case management orders" under Rules 16 and 
26 in a ~ase involving a large number of parties. 63 The appellate 
court approved the trial court's finding that the need to manage 
complex litigation efficaciously overrode the claims of the plain-
tiffs' attorneys to privacy under the work product doctrine.64 
There also have been some close cases in which district courts 
denied the discovery requests of civil rights plaintiffs or appellate 
courts deferred to those decisions. For instance, in an employ-
ment discrimination suit, the magistrate and the trial judge deter-
mined that plaintiffs interrogatories were overbroad and unduly 
burdensome under Rule 26(b)(l).611 The Fjrst Circuit, stating that 
it would intervene only if plaintiff clearly demonstrated that the 
61. Id. 
62. See, e.g., Orbovich v. Macalester College, 119 F.R.D. 411, 412, 416 (D. Minn. 1988); 
Youngblood v. Gates, 112 F.R.D. 342, 344, 348 (C.D. Cal. 1985). See generally Subrin, How 
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Per-
spective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 922 (1987) (Federal Rules exceeded even equity's signifi-
cant permissiveness and flexibility in discovery); Tobias, supra note 1, at 284-85 (substan-
tive statutes). 
63. In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., 859 F.2d 1007, 1013 (1st Cir. 1988). 
64. Id. at 1013-21. 
65. See Mack v. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co., 871 F.2d 179, 186 (1st Cir. 1989). 
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district court's discovery ruling was "plainly wrong and resulted 
in substantial prejudice,'' ruled that plaintiff had shown no abuse 
of discretion.88 Nonetheless, the panel remarked that the trial 
"court could possibly have allowed [plaintiff's interrogatories], 
but it was certainly free to call the shot the other way,'' while 
making several similar observations which indicated that the case 
was close.87 
4. Inherent Judicial Authority 
Some judges apparently believe that their considerable discre-
tion, even as substantially enhanced by the 1983 amendments, re-
mains inadequate, especially to remedy the litigation explosion. 
Courts, thus, have found additional ways of augmenting that dis-
cretion. The quintessential example of the phenomenon is the 
ever-broadening ambit that courts have claimed for the exercise 
of inherent judicial authority. 88 
Inherent judicial authority is power that the Constitution, stat-
utes and Federal Rules do not specifically provide courts; it is 
authority which is implied or is required to effectuate those pow-
ers expressly prescribed or the power necessary for a court to 
function as a court.89 The authority traditionally was considered 
to be quite narrow, and the Supreme Court stated as recently as 
1980 that "[b]ecause inherent powers are shielded from direct 
democratic controls, they must be exercised with restraint and 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 187. "[I]t seems to us that the interrogatories at best fell into, and quite prob-
ably beyond, the gray area at th.e discovery margin." Id. Other examples of cases that seem 
close are Santiago v. Fenton, 891 F.2d 373, 379-81 (1st Cir. 1989) and Gomez v. City of 
Nashau, 126 F.R.D. 432, 434-37 (D.N.H. 1989). 
When resolving discovery controversies, numerous trial judges have struck a fair balance 
between the interests of civil rights plaintiffs and defendants. See, e.g., Dinkins v. Ohio, 
116 F.R.D. 270, 272-74 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Burke v. New York City Police Dep't, 115 F.R.D. 
220 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). Moreover, a few courts have been sensitive to the litigants' resource 
disparities. See, e.g., Bills v. Kennecott Corp., 108 F.R.D. 459, 464 (D. Utah 1985) (denying 
defendant's motion for discovery costs); Wigler v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 108 F.R.D. 
204, 206 (D. Md. 1985) (defendant's requests for admissions imposed undue burden on 
plaintiff, considering "circumstances of this single-plaintiff employment discrimination 
case"); see also Isaac v. Harvard Univ., 769 F.2d 817, 828 (1st Cir. 1985). 
68. See generally Comment, supra note 40, at 1510-13. 
69. This description is derived from three circuit court opinions that comprehensively 
discuss the concept. See Nasco, Inc. v. Calcasieu Television & Radio, 894 F.2d 696, 702-06 
(5th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 38 (1990); G. Heile-
man Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Co., 871 F.2d 648, 650-53 (7th Cir. 1989); Eash v. Riggins 
Trucking Co., 757 F.2d 557, 561-64 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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discretion. "70 
Nevertheless, the federal judiciary, especially since the mid-
1980's, has increasingly relied upon this essentially uncabined 
power when applying the 1983 amendments, other Federal Rules, 
and additional procedural provisions to enlarge its discretion. 
Most of the courts that decided the cases analyzed in the subsec-
tion on Rule 16's enforcement also invoked inherent judicial au-
thority. For example, many of the judges who relied on Rule 16 to 
mandate summary jury trials71 or to dismiss plaintiffs' cases72 
premised their determinations on inherent power as well. More-
over, some courts have relied on inherent authority to assess the 
costs of empaneling juries against litigants that settled cases on 
the eve of trial. 73 
Indeed, the Supreme Court recently accorded the inherent 
power doctrine one of its broadest articulations in Hoffman-La 
Roche v. Sperling.74 The Court,' proclaiming that "courts tradi-
tionally have exercised considerable authority to manage their 
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious resolution 
of cases"711 extended the reach of the inherent powers concept fur-
ther than in earlier cases.76 The Court recognized that inherent 
authority reinforced Rule 83's endorsement of district court 
power to facilitate the provision of notice in cases with numerous 
potential plaintiffs, where written consent is statutorily required 
for multiple plaintiffs to join in one suit. 77 
70. Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980). 
71. See, e.g., Federal Reserve Bank v. Carey-Canada, Inc., 123 F.R.D. 603, 604 (D. 
Minn. 1988); McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43, 48 (E.D. Ky. 1988). 
72. See, e.g., Thompson v. Housing Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 831 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 829 (1986); Callip v. Harris County Child Welfare Dep't, 757 F.2d 1513, 1518 (5th Cir. 
1985). 
73. See, e.g., White v. Raymark Indus., 783 F.2d 1175 (4th Cir. 1986); Eash v. Riggins 
Trucking Co., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985). 
74. 110 S. Ct. 482 (1989). 
75. Id. at 487 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)). 
76. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 69. 
77. See Sperling, 110 S. Ct. at 487; see also Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988). The majority's invocation of inherent authority in Sperling ap-
pears to be dicta and may be limited. Nonetheless, Justice Scalia's stinging dissent, essen-
tially accusing the majority of exceeding constitutional bounds, does not leave that impres-
sion. See Sperling, 110 S. Ct. at 488-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court may 
extend the inherent powers idea further when it decides Nasco. See Nasco, Inc. v. Calca-
sieu Television & Radio, 894 F.2d 696, 702-06 (5th Cir.)', cert. granted sub nom. Chambers 
v. Nasco, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 38 (1990); see also Business Guides v. Chromatic Communica-
tions Enters., 111 S. Ct. 922, 935, 940-42 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
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B. Informal Activity Involving the 1983 Amendments 
There is considerable and increasing evidence of informal activ-
ity involving the 1983 amendments that has disadvantaged many 
litigants, particularly those whose active participation in lawsuits 
Congress intended to encourage. For instance, judges have 
threatened to impose Rule 11 sanctions on civil rights parties and 
lawyers who refused to withdraw counts that the courts believed 
were frivolous or have levied large assessments in unpublished 
opinions. 78 There have been analogous threats under Rule 16 
where parties or attorneys display~d reluctance to participate in 
certain forms of alternative dispute resolution, such as summary 
jury trials. 79 Judges have lodged similar threats when they 
thought that the litigants or their counsel had not made good 
faith efforts to settle cases or that lawyers were inadequately pre-
pared for pretrial conf erences.8° Courts also have relied on Rule 
26 to pressure litigants and practitioners who filed discovery pa-
pers that judges deemed 'inappropriate. 81 
This anecdotal evidence comports with reasonable inferences 
that may be drawn from formal judicial decisionmaking under the 
1983 amendments. If courts, in print, have enforced the Rules so 
broadly and have exercised such expansive discretion, they would 
be more likely to do so in informal settings, because the prospects 
for being questioned or being held accountable are significantly 
diminished.82 Thus, the informal application of the amendments 
and the informal exercise of judicial discretion may well be· more 
problematic than their formal counterparts. · 
78. See Tobias, Recalibrating Rule 11 in Ciuil Rights Litigation, 36 VILL. L. REV. 105, 
117 (1991) (threats); Tobias, supra note 5, at 501-02, 505-06 (same); Tobias, supra note 34, 
at 10 n.61 (same). Cf. A. MILLER, supra note 7, at 38 (discovery sanctions frequently 
unrep~rted). -
79. These ideas are premised on conversations with lawyers who represent public inter-
est litigants and civil rights plaintiffs. See generally supra text accompanying notes 36-47. 
80. These ideas are premised on conversations with lawyers who represent public inter-
est litigants and civil rights plaintiffs. See generally supra notes 48-70 and accompanying 
text. 
81. These ideas are premised on conversations with litigants and lawyers who pursue 
public interest and civil rights litigation. 
82. By this, I mean that the possibilities. for abuse in informal settings seem substan-
tially greater because of the lack of accountability that published decisionmaking in some 
measure provides. 
1991] JUDICIAL DISCRETION 951 
C. Implications 
The judicial activity analyzed above has had numerous impor-
tant consequences. It apparently has dampened the enthusiasm of 
public interest litigants and attorneys, particularly civil rights 
plaintiffs and practitioners.Ba These parties and lawyers have ex-
perienced chilling effects primarily because their relative lack of 
power and resources makes them risk averse.B" This phenomenon 
is especially troubling. Congress has clearly stated in much sub-
stantive, procedural and fee-shifting legislation that the federal 
judiciary should facilitate the litigants' and attorneys' participa-
tion in federal civil litigation so that they may vindicate constitu-
tional rights and statutory interests, such as the right to be free 
from racial or gender discrimination. 811 Thus, to the extent that 
judges exercise their discretion in ways which discourage the in-
volvement of these parties and lawyers, the courts are frustrating 
congressional intent of those statutes enacted by Congress.Be 
In short, numerous federal judges have exercised their discre-
tion in problematic ways. Moreover, there is much evidence that 
application of the 1983 amendments has seriously disadvantaged 
83. Civil rights plaintiffs have experienced considerably more chilling than other public 
interest litigants, such as plaintiffs in environmental litigation. See Tobias, supra note 78, 
at 109; Tobias, supra note 5, at 503-06; Tobias, supra note 34, at 17-18. See generally 
Vairo, supra note 20, at 200-02. But cf. Maine Audubon Soc'y .v. Purslow, 907 F.2d 265, 
268-69 (1st Cir. 1990) (recent example affirming imposition of sanctions on plaintiff in 
environmental case). · 
84. See Tobias, supra note 78, at 109. See generally Tobias, supra note 5, at 495-98. Of 
course, I am concerned when judicial discretion is improperly exercised against any federal 
court litigant; however, the superior resources of some litigants, such as large corporations, 
better enable them to protect their interests. Even those litigants may be unwilling to 
commit substantial resources to appeals, especially on "questions of principle." For exam-
ple, two corporations which lost very important inherent authority cases did not file cer-
tiorari petitions. See G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Co., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 
1989); Eash v. Riggins Trucking Co., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985). 
85. See, e.g., Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 
(1988); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). · 
86. The most recent indication of congressional recognition of this dynamic is introduc-
tion of the Civil Rights Act of 1990. in response to six decisions of the Supreme Court's 
1988 •Term which many members of Congress believed violated congressional intent. See 
H.R. 4000, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 2104, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. (1990). See gener-
ally Comment, Reconstruction, Deconstruction and Legislative Response: The 1988 Su-
preme Court Term and the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 475 (1990). 
That legislation did not pass because the Senate failed to override President Bush's veto 
by one vote. Lewis, President's Veto of Rights Measure Survives By One Vote, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 25, 1990, at Al, col. 3. Strong, new legislation has been introduced in the 102d 
Congress. See H.R. 1, 102d Cong., lat Sess; (1991); New Battle Looming as Democrats 
Reintroduce Civil Rights Measure, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1991, at A12, col. 2. 
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many litigants, especially parties whose participation Congress 
specifically intended to promote. The third section, accordingly, 
offers recommendations for the future. 
Ill. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The course of action that should be pursued remains quite con-. 
troversial. Perhaps the most disputed questions are whether any 
of the provisions in amended Rules 11, 16 and 26 should be re-
pealed or revised. Recent developments have made the issues 
more controversial. In August 1990, the Advisory Committee is-
sued a call for written comments on the operation of the 1983 
amendments, scheduled a hearing for February, 1991, to receive 
oral submissions on their application, and stated that the Com-
mittee would consider revision thereafter.87 
A. Possible Revision 
1. Rule 11 
Numerous observers have argued that Rule 11 should not be 
repealed or amended in the near future. Both the Third Circuit 
Task Force on Rule 11, which analyzed all Rule 11 activity in that 
geographic area during a recent one-year period,88 and Judge 
Schwarzer, a long-time advocate of vigorous Rule 11 enforcement 
and a jurist to whom many judges look for guidance in applying 
the Rule,89 have stated that Rule ll's benefits, namely forcing 
lawyers to "stop and think" before they file papers, and reducing 
litigation abuse, substantially outweigh its disadvantages, such as 
chilling civil rights plaintiffs and necessitating expensive satellite 
litigation. 90 
87. See Call for Comments, supra note 60. See also Labaton, Courts Rethinking Rule 
Intended To Slow Frivolous Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 1990, at BIS, col. 1. 
88. Sees. BURBANK, RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK 
FORCE ON FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (American Judicature Soc'y 1989). 
89. See Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013 (1988) [hereinafter 
Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited); see also Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 
103 F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984), rev'd, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986); Schwarzer, Sane· 
tions Under the New Rule 11: A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985) [hereinafter 
Schwarzer, A Closer Look]. Judge Schwarzer is now the Executive Director of the Federal 
Judicial Center. Recent examples of cases in which courts have cited Judge Schwarzer's 
work include Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447, 2454 (1990); Lancellotte v. 
Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 18, 19 (1st Cir. 1990); Allen v. Utley, 129 F.R.D. 1, 11 (D.D.C. 1990). 
90. See S. BURBANK, supra note 88, at 95; Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, supra note 89, 
at 1014. 
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Professor Arthur Miller, who was the Reporter for the Advisory 
Committee when the 1983 amendments were promulgated, stated 
in July, 1990, that "[i]t would be unfortunate if the decibel level 
of the debate over Rule 11 led to its precipitous revision before 
sufficient experience accumulated. "91 Professor Miller claimed 
that "considerable progress has been made" but urged that "pa-
tience is needed," acknowledging that the process of refining Rule 
ll's application "will take many more years."92 Moreover, Profes-
sor Melissa Nelken, who has undertaken considerable analysis of 
the Rule, recommended in early 1990 that it not be repealed, ofr 
fering instead valuable suggestions for amendment that would be 
responsive to the needs of civil rights plaintiffs.93 More recently, 
she found that Rule 11 activity in the Northern District of Cali- · 
fornia apparently had numerous positive effects, which accorded 
with the rulemakers' expectations, but also had some negative im-
pacts, particularly a "chilling effect on developments in the 
law."94 
Furthermore, Judge Grady, then-Chair of the Advisory Com-
mittee, observed in February, 1990, that there must be additional 
study of Rule 11 before modification could be seriously ex-
amined.96 Moreover, formal Rule 11 judicial decisionmaking has 
been improving generally and for civil rights plaintiffs in particu-
lar since approximately the beginning of 1989.98 
Most of the developments above have led me to be more opti-
mistic about Rule ll's application than I was several years ago 
when I recommended expeditious repeal.97 Nevertheless, certain 
aspects of Rule 11 enforcement remain sufficiently problematic 
91. Miller, The New Certification Standard Under Rule 11, 130 F.R.D. 479, 505 (1990) 
(footnote omitted). He found this to be "especially true since there are signs that the 
practice under the rule has begun to stabilize and the overly enthusiastic hyperactivity of 
the first few years following its promulgation has begun to subside." Id. at 506. 
92. Id. at 505. 
93. See Nelken, Has the Chancellor Shot Himself in the Foot? Looking for a Middle 
Ground on Rule 11 Sanctions, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 383 (1990). 
94. Nelken, The Impact of Federal Rule 11 on Lawyers and Judges in the Northern 
District of California, 74 JUDICATURE 148, 150 (1990). "[T)he sample was too small to 
make any generalizations about the rule's impact" on civil rights lawyers. Id. at 152. Pro-
fessor Nelken's findings are especially important, because many judges in the Northern 
District of California have vigorously enforced Rule 11. 
95. See Letter from Judge John Grady to Representative Robert Kastenmeier, Chair, 
House of Representatives Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual 
Property and the Administration of Justice (Feb. 9, 1990) (copy on file with author). 
96. See Tobias, supra note 78, at 110-16. 
97. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 513-15, 522-24. 
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for Civil rights plaintiffs, other litigants and the civil justice sys-
tem, particularly in contrast with the Rule's rather limited bene-
fits, to warrant prompt amendment of the provision. 
Informal Rule 11 activity, such as judicial threats made in 
chambers to sanction civil rights plaintiffs, remains especially 
troubling. 98 It apparently comprises much of the activity that sig-
nificantly disadvantages civil rights plaintiffs, and it is the most 
difficult to detect. Furthermore, unwarranted and expensive sat-
ellite litigation, inconsistent judicial application, and the occa-
sional imposition of large sanctions continue to plague other par-
ties, including some public interest litigants, as well as the civil 
litigation process. 99 
There currently is ample information to support rational 'deter-
minations about revision of the Rule. For instance, the new ver-
sion could require a finding that parties or lawyers abused the 
litigation process before Rule 11 is contravened or monetary sanc-
tions are imposed.100 
2. Rule 16 and Rule 26 
Rule 16's application has generated less debate than Rule 11, 
while Rule 26's enforcement has provoked little controversy. Sev-
eral elements of Rule 16's implementation have afforded benefits, 
such as expediting the resolution of disputes. These benefits, 
however, are outweighed by several negative factors. Important 
considerations are the disadvantages created by formal and infor-
mal Rule 16 activity, principally the chilling of parties whose in-
volvement in federal civil litigation Congress sought to foster. An-
other factor is the possibility of applying measures, such as civil 
contempt, which would be less problematic but as effective. 
Consequently, those responsible for rule amendment should 
now consider some changes. For example, Rule 16 violations 
might be limited to serious misbehavior of litigants or lawyers, 
while the sanction of attorneys fees could be levied only for egre-
gious· misconduct.101 An example of conduct which would contra-
vene a revised Rule 16 is the refusal to heed multiple court or-
98. See supra text accompanying notes 78-82. 
99. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30 and text accompanying notes 34-35. 
100. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 515-17 (these and additional suggestions for Rule 11 
amendment). 
101. These recommendations are somewhat similar to suggestions I have made for revis-
ing Rule 11. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 515-17. 
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ders, even after judges have· granted extensions or issued warnings 
that sanctions might be imposed for failure to comply.102 
The enforcement of Rule 26 has yielded benefits . similar to 
Rule 16, namely facilitating discovery and the prompt conclusion 
of lawsuits. The problems enumerated in the second section, such 
as the relatively small number of reported Rule 26 .decisions and 
the rather limited information on informal Rule 26 activity, com-
plicate analysis of the Rule's detrimental impact. Nonetheless, 
Rule 26's implementation has significantly disadvantaged civil 
rights plaintiffs while affording comparatively minimal benefits. 
It is appropriate, therefore, to examine revision. The similarity 
between the provisions governing rule violations and the imposi-
tion of sanctions under Rule 26 and Rule 11 mean that the Advi-
sory Committee should consider changes like those recommended 
for Rule 11 and, at least ought to make Rule 26 sanctioning 
discretionary. 
There is substantial need to modify certain aspects of Rules 11, 
16 and 26 immediately. Nevertheless, the Advisory Committee 
will not seriously explore amendment until it has evaluated the 
results of several Rule 11 studies, the material that was tendered 
in response to the Committee's call for' written comments on the 
Rules' implementation, and the oral testimony and data submit-
ted at the February, 1991 hearing. It is important, therefore, to 
consider the prospect of more study. 
B. Additional Study 
Additional study of Rule ll's implementation is not a prerequi-
site to reasoned decisionmaking about the provision's revision. 108 
Considerable data to support informed judgments already exist. 
New Rule 11 analyses will requfre the commitment of significant 
resources. While such assessments are being conducted, Rule 11 
enforcement that is insufficiently solicitous of civil rights plain-
tiffs will continue to disadvantage them. Moreover, the informa-
tion that is collected will .not substantially advance present un-
derstanding of the Rule's application. 
The Federal Judicial Center, at the Advisory Committee's re-
102. See, e.g., Thompson v. Housing Auth., 782 F.2d 829, 830-31 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
479 u:s. 829 (1986); Callip v. Harris County Child Welfare Dep't, 757 F.2d 1513, 1516-17, 
1522 (5th Cir. 1985); Dukes v. Ward, 129 F.R.D. 478, 481-82 (8.D.N.Y. 1990); cf. Minotti v. 
Lensink, 895 F.2d 100, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1990) (same as to Rule 37). 
103. See T. WILLGING. THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS (1988). 
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quest, however, has recently finished gathering data on Rule 11 
activity since 1987 in five district courts which have fully comput-
erized docket inforn~ation. This effort, which involved a question-
naire on Rule 11 which was circulated to all district judges in the 
participating districts, will supplement the relatively recent eval-
uation conducted under its auspices.10• Moreover, the American 
Judicature Society has commenced an empirical study of Rule 11 
activity in the Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits which appar-
ently will be modeled on the earlier work of the Third Circuit 
Task Force. 1011 These new endeavors, as well as the information 
submitted in response to the Advisory Committee's call for com-
ments, should yield additional valuable material for the use of the 
rule revisors as they contemplate Rule ll's amendment. 
All of this work and numerous other Rule 11 assessments 
should also inform analyses of activity involving Rules 16 and 26. 
The Advisory Committee's recent announcement that it may soon 
revise Rule 26 and its failure to mention Rule 16, increase the 
compelling need to collect, evaluate, and synthesize as much data 
as feasible on' the courts' enforcement of the 1983 amendments to 
Rule 16 and Rule 26. It is especially important to assemble infor-
mation on informal implementation and enforcement which has 
adversely affected the parties whose involvement Congress meant 
to encourage. Certain aspects of these studies, such as precisely 
identifying chilling effects and pinpointing litigation and discov-
ery abuses, are quite difficult to complete with the desired accu-
racy.106 Nonetheless, it is possible to offer numerous suggestions 
for future assessments, particularly by drawing on prior evalua-
104. See Studies Examine Rule 11 's Impact, Nat'! L.J., July 30, 1990, at 32, col. 4; see 
also Call for Comments, supra note 60. The Center has conducted a preliminary analysis 
of the data, and the Advisory Committee asked for refinement of that assessment during 
the February 21, 1991 public hearing on Rule 11. Telephone conversation with Thomas 
Willging, Deputy Research Director, Federal Judicial Center (Feb. 26, 1991). See generally 
PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 30. Professor Erwin Chemerinsky of the University, of 
Southern California Law Center also has recently commenced a study of Rule 11 activity 
in the Ninth Circuit. 
105. See American Judicature Society Rule 11 Project (1990) (copy on file with author); 
American Judicature Society Rule 11 Study (Questionnaire) (copy on file with author); 
telephone conversation with Professor Bert Kritzer, Department of Political Science, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin, and Co-Director of Rule 11 Project (Mar. 7, 1991). 
106. For example, "there are problems of definition, detection and measurement be-
cause chilling effects themselves are intangible and amorphous." Tobias, supra note 30, at 
177. See also id. at 177-79. 
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tions and recommendations for study. 107 
· Future work should be as comprehensive and rigorous as possi-
ble, focusing on the consequences for civil rights plaintiffs and 
other public interest litigants of judicial implementation of Rules 
16 and 26. Analysts should systematically gather, assess and syn-
thesize information in enough geographic locales, having suffi-
ciently diverse legal cultures and judicial perspectives on the two 
Rules, over adequate time to provide substantial assurance of va-
lidity.108 Efforts should be undertaken to determine how many 
sanctions requests have been filed and granted against civil rights 
plaintiffs and other public interest litigants, the exact amount of 
informal Rule 16 and Rule 26 activity that has implicated these 
litigants, and the quantity of satellite litigation which has 
resulted. 
Evaluators should attempt to ascertain whether courts have en-
forced the two Rules against civil rights plaintiffs with the same 
vigor as Rule 11. For example, analogies between Rules 11 and 26 
warrant scrutinizing judicial application of Rule 26's require-
ments governing violations and mandatory sanctions.109 Assessors 
should determine how often courts found that civil rights plain-
tiffs had contravened Rule 26's reasonable prefiling inquiry com-
mand, how many of these cases were close, whether the courts 
imposed monetary sanctions, and if so, their magnitude. These 
figures should be compared with similar data compiled on Rule 
11. 
Correspondingly, evaluators examining Rule 16's judicial imple-
mentation might attempt to ascertain the relative frequency and 
strength with which courts have pressured unwilling litigants and 
lawyers, especially civil rights plaintiffs and attorneys, to partici-
pate in summary jury trials, settlement negotiations and other 
types of alternative dispute resolution. Rule 16, unlike Rules 11 
and 26, does not mandate the imposition of sanctions when it is 
violated. Accordingly, how often judges have exercised their dis-
cretion in levying sanctions and the assessments imposed should 
107. See, e.g., S. BURBANK, supra note 88; Tobias, supra note 5; Tobias, supra note 30; 
T. WILLGING, supra note 103; see also Marcus, Public Law Litigation and Legal Scholar-
ship, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 647, 686-91 (1988) (difficulties of gathering empirical data). 
108. See Tobias, supra note 30, at 178. 
109. A LEXIS search conducted on May 1, 1991 indicated that judges had issued 10 
published opinions involving civil rights and rule 26(g). 
958 RUTGERS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 43:933 
yield helpful insights. no 
Rules 16 and 26 provide courts with numerous opportunities to 
take informal action, the type of behavior that can most harm 
civil rights plaintiffs.111 It is, therefore, crucial to evaluate this in-
formal activity, which may be more significant than correspond-
ing conduct under Rule 11. For instance, judges can disadvantage 
litigants with limited resources when drafting scheduling orders 
or encouraging settlement pursuant to Rule 16 or when tailoring 
discovery to the needs of the case or to the importance of the 
issues at stake under Rule 26. Evaluators should attempt to as-
certain how substantially these and similar types of informal ac-
tivity have discouraged civil rights plaintiffs. 
Significant to many of the suggestions presented here will be 
the systematic collection, analysis and documentation of informa-
tion on the informal application of Rules 16 and 26.112 An impor-
tant means of assembling these data is to seek the perspectives of 
persons, groups and attorneys who contemplated filing, or actu-
ally have brought, civil rights actions. After evaluators have gath-
ered and assessed this information, they should be able to ascer-
. tain with considerable certainty how extensively courts' 
enforcement of Rule 16 and Rule 26 has disadvantaged civil 
rights plaintiffs and their counsel as well as other litigants, attor-
neys and the civil justice system. 
Assessors should then calculate the advantages of the two 
Rules' implementation. For instance, there might be estimates of 
how much Rule 26's application has reduced discovery abuse and 
the extent to which Rule 16's enforcement has expedited dispute 
resolution. Evaluators also should compute the value of the de-
creased discovery abuse and the more prompt dispute disposition 
which have been afforded civil rights plaintiffs, other parties and 
the ci.vil litigation process. 
Once the benefits and disadvantages above have been compiled, 
they should be assigned values. Next, several additional factors 
that are not actually benefits or disadvantages should be con-
sulted. One important consideration is Congress' express intent 
that civil rights plaintiffs' active involvement in litigation be fa-
110. A LEXIS search conducted on May l, 1991 indicated that judges had issued 37 
published opinions involving civil rights and rule 16(0. · 
111. See Tobias, supra note 30, at 178-79; Tobias, supra note 78, at 117. 
112. See Tobias; supra note 78, at 124-26. 
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cilitated. 118 This means, for example, that the systemic benefits of 
the two Rules' application would have to be substantial before 
they could outweigh any significant disadvantages to these plain-
tiffs. Correspondingly, there should be thorough exploration of al-
ternatives to Rules 16 and 26 that might be equally efficacious 
but which have less detrimental impacts on civil rights plaintiffs. 
These measures might include state bar ethics requirements and 
judicial reliance on civil contempt and case management, or invo-
cation of other sanctioning power under 28 U.S.C. section 1927 or 
courts' inherent authority. 114 It also would be helpful to know ex-
actly how much responsibility civil rights plaintiffs bear for dis-
covery abuse and for the delayed disposition of lawsuits. 
When all of these considerations have been assembled and val-
ued, it should be possible to achieve some resolution which ac-
commodates the respective needs of civil rights plaintiffs, other 
types of litigants and the civil justice system. Congress, the Su-
preme Court and the Advisory Committee should be able, in turn, 
to determine whether additional revision of the 1983 changes in 
Rules 16 and 26 that do not govern sanctions is appropriate, and, 
if so, how amendment could best be accomplished. 
C. Judicial Application of the 1983 Amendments 
While the data on Rule 16 and Rule 26 are being gathered and 
analyzed, and until Rule 11 is revised, federal courts should en-
force the 1983 amendments to all three rules more judiciously. 
For example, judges should apply Rule 11 with greater solicitude 
for civil rights plaintiffs who are peculiarly susceptible to being 
chilled,1111 a phenomenon that numerous appellate courts have re-
cently recognized. 116 
Judges should consider limiting enforcement of the Rule. 
Courts could confine Rule 11 violations. to instances of litigation 
113. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 28 
U.S.C. § 1477 (1982)). See generally Tobias, supra note 1, at 284-85. 
114. For examination of these alternatives, see Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., 836 F.2d 
866, 870 n.3 (5th Cir. 1988); SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS (G. Joseph, P. San-
dler & C. Shaffer 2d ed. 1988); Vairo, supra note 20, at 233. 
115. See Tobias, supra note 5, at 513-22. 
116. See, e.g., Simpson v. Welch, 900 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1990) (vacating Rule 11 sanc-
tion against title VII plaintiff); Kraemer v. Grant County; 892 F.2d 686, 690 (7th Cir. 
1990) (acknowledging Rule ll's chilling effect in civil rights cases involving unpopular cli-
ents). See generally Tobias, supra note 78, at 109. 
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abuse, as some members of the Third Circuit have suggested.117 
Correspondingly, judges may wish to assess sanctions of attor-
neys' fees only when parties or lawyers have engaged in egregious 
misbehavior.118 
Courts choosing to apply Rule 11 more broadly should remem-
ber that civil rights plaintiffs usually lack access to material im-
portant for conducting prefiling factual inquiries which appear 
reasonable and often plead legal theories which are not tradi-
tional. Concomitantly, if judges find that these parties have con-
travened Rule 11, the courts should levy the "least severe sanc-
tion" necessary.119 They also should keep in mind numerous non-
monetary options, which include a "warm, friendly discussion on 
the record, a hard-nosed reprimand in open court [and] compul-
sory legal education.m2o 
All of these suggestions pertain equally to Rule 26 provisions 
analogous to those in Rule 11, and to parts of Rule 26 which are 
dissimilar. For instance, judges applying the Rule 26(b)(l) criteria 
to requests that civil rights plaintiffs' discovery be limited as un-
duly burdensome should remember that these plaintiffs typically 
seek non-monetary, declaratory or injunctive relief, frequently at-
tempt to vindicate significant constitutional rights and statutory 
interests of many non-parties, and generally have limited re-
sources for doing so.121 
Correspondingly, courts enforcing Rule 16 should not invoke it 
to demand that unwilling litigants participate in summary jury 
trials, settlement negotiations, or additional alternatives to dis-
pute resolution, especially in lawsuits implicating important pub-
lic values. 122 Moreover, when civil rights plaintiffs have violated 
the Rule, judges should seriously consider exercising their discre-
117. See, e.g., Doering v. Union County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 194 
(3d Cir. 1988); Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1988). 
118. Egregious misconduct is activity that exceeds serious misbehavior. See, e.g., supra 
note 102 and accompanying text. 
119. See, e.g., Schwarzer, A Closer Look, supra note 89, at 201; Thomas v. Capital Sec. 
Servs., 836 F.2d 866, 878 (5th Cir. 1988); Cabell v. Petty, 810 F.2d 463, 466-67 (4th Cir. 
1987). 
120. Thomas, 836 F.2d at 878. 
121. The court shall limit discovery if it is "unduly burdensome or expensive" consider-
ing the "needs of the case ... limitations on the parties' resources, and the importance of 
the issues at stake in the litigation." FED. R. C1v. P. 26(b)(l). See generally supra text 
accompanying notes 81-84. 
122. See Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema, 99 HARV. L. 
REV. 668, 679-80 (1986); Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). 
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tion not to sanction. Courts also must avoid applying either Rule 
16 or 26 informally in ways that dampen these litigants' 
enthusiasm. 
Courts should keep in mind as well that many observers, in-
cluding numerous members of Congress, consider the public val-
ues that civil rights plaintiffs attempt to vindicate more impor-
tant than the prompt resolution of lawsuits. 123 Indeed, the federal 
judiciary must temper its concerns about case dispositions to the 
apparent exclusion of practically all else, including congressional 
intent. If the courts fail to do so, the litigation explosion appears 
destined to drive all discretionary procedural decisionmaking in 
ways that promise to impoverish procedural discourse and which 
could lead to a confrontation with Congress. 
D. Congress, the Supreme Court and. the Advisory 
Committee 
Ample, troubling ·evidence regarding Rule 11 's enforcement 
warrants its immediate repeal or modification. The Advisory 
Committee, with the information gleaned from responses to its 
call for comments, the February, 1991 hearing and the data de-
rived from the Rule 11 studies which have recently been com-
pleted, should be able to expeditiously draft proposed language 
repealing or altering Rule 11 for Supreme Court and congres-
sional consideration. If the Committee and the Court do not sug-
gest the repeal or modification of the provision, Congress may 
want to change the Rule independently. Congress, however, has 
been relatively reluctant to act independently, apparently out of 
deference to Advisory Committee expertise and concern for the 
inter-branch, cooperative nature of the rules revision process, in-
volving delicate relationships between Congress and the Court. 124 
123. See, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 
1281, 1302-04 (1976); Fiss, supra note 122, at 1086-87; Tobias, supra note 1, at 337. Con-
gress has recently evinced increased interest in expediting dispute resolution. See, e.g., 
The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (provi-
sion of Judicial Improvement Act of 1990 calling for civil justice expense and delay reduc-
tion plans); 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988) (provisions of Judicial Improvements and Access 
to Justice Act of 1988 calling for court-annexed arbitration). 
124. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 293, 337-40. But cf. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act 
of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1018-20 (1982) (documenting increased congressional will-
ingness since 1973 to intercept proposed rules and amendments governing evidence and · 
civil, criminal, and appellate procedure). See generally Friedenthal, The Rulemaking 
Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975). 
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The rule-amending authorities should explore the possibility of 
revising certain aspects of the sanctioning provision included in 
Rule 26, particularly its mandatory character, as well as the sanc-
tioning provision in Rule 16. The amendment of additional por-
tions of the two Rules that were changed in 1983 may have to 
await the collection, analysis, and synthesis of more data on their 
application. 
Congress should do everything possible to promote the neces-
sary studies of Rules 16 and 26. It should provide the requisite 
resources and encourage assessments by governmental organiza-
tions, such as the Federal Judicial Center, and expert, impartial 
entities outside the government, such as the American Judicature 
Society. 
Congress should also consider exploring whether the 1983 
amendments have ceded excessive discretion to the judiciary, dis-
cretion that has been exercised in ways which frustrate congres-
sional intent. Insofar as courts' enforcement of the 1983 revisions 
has chilled civil rights plaintiffs, the implementation has under-
mined congressional intent evidenced in substantive, procedural, 
and fee-shifting legislation that such parties' participation be fa-
cilitated. If Congress finds that judicial application has eroded 
this intent, as it did with numerous Supreme Court rulings of the 
1988 Term, Congress could pass remedial procedural legislation 
analogous to the Civil Rights Act of 1990. 1211 Indeed, Congress 
should broadly analyze whether the courts have invoked proce-
dural provisions in a manner that frustrates its intent in substan-
tive civil rights, and other, laws. Were Congress to conduct such a 
survey, it would discover that many judges implement procedures 
in ways which frustrate congressional intent and that this appli-
cation requires correction.126 
CONCLUSION 
The 1983 amendments to Federal Rules 11, 16 and 26 were an 
experiment that considerably enhanced the federal judiciary's 
discretion. Numerous courts have enforced the new provisions in 
ways which detrimentally affect many litigants, especially civil 
125. See Tobias, Civil Rights Procedural Legislation (1991) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author); supra note 86 and accompanying text for discussion of recent con-
gressional efforts. 
126. See Tobias, Access, Excess, Congress (1991) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
author). 
1991] JUDICIAL DISCRETION 963 
rights plaintiffs whose involvement in federal civil litigation Con-
gress clearly intended to promote. Judicial application of revised 
Rule 11 has been sufficiently problematic to warrant prompt re-
peal or amendment. Moreover, the sanctioning requirements in-
cluded in revised Rules 16 and 26 should be changed soon. It is 
unclear whether the remaining provisions of the two Rules that 
were amended in 1983 should be modified. Consequently, collec-
tion, analysis and synthesis of additional data on their implemen-
tation ought to proceed. Once that. work is concluded, the Advi-
sory Committee, the Supreme Court and Congress should be able 
to ascertain whether amendment is indicated. 
